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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-6111

DT-S

10 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SUN STREAK Operational Report - 8712-A (U)

- 1. (S/NF/SK) During the period of 4 September 1987 through 9 September 1987, four remote viewers conducted four sessions against Essential Elements of Information (EEI) levied under Project 8712-A (TAB A) in an effort to determine the nature and scope of perceived hostile activity against US-flagged vessels sailing the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The sessions were conducted independently without the assistance or presence of a monitor/interviewer.
- (S/NF/SK) Copies of viewer summaries are at TAB B through TAB E inclusively. Two viewers specified 15 September 1987 as the date of anticipated hostile activity to be directed against a US-flagged vessel(s). Two other viewers estimated the date of anticipated hostile activity "about" 14 September 1987. In the second instance, the projected date was mathematically computed from available data provided by the viewers while in session. A review of available data from two viewers indicates the nature of the hostile activity as the firing of a silkworm missile against a US-flagged tanker occurring within the indicated time frame. The other two viewers provided information indicative of a hostile activity, but the nature of the hostile activity is not clearly defined. Two viewers perceived the US as playing a minor role in the swift, retaliatory activity taken against the hostile forces. One viewer did perceive a limited loss of (US) life to hostile forces.

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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CLASSIFIED BY: DIA, DT DECLASSIFY BY: OADR

Approved For Release 2000/08/08: CIA-RDP96-00789R000200050001-4

Approved For Release 2000/08/03 VIA-R pt 36-00789R000200050001-4

3. (S/NF/SK) COMMENTS: Sessions were conducted in a predictive mode, specifically, viewers were tasked to go forward in time and report their perceptions. On an equally innovative note, viewers were asked to conduct their sessions without the assistance of and interviewer/viewer. The viewing activity was undertaken in view of a perceived, potential increase in the strength of the signal line as the likelihood of the event taking place approaches in real time.

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5 Enclosures TAB A 8712 -A TABS B thru E Summaries & Drawings LTC, USA Branch Chief

3

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000200050001-4



3 September 1987

- 1. PROJECT: 8712 A
- 2. ENCRYPTED COORDINATES: 279400/555141
- 3. BACKGROUND: During the month of September 1987, US-flagged vessels sailing the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf are susceptible to Iranian hostile activities conducted by land, sea, or air. Assuming the signal line increases in intensity as the date of the event (target) draws near (eg, the President Kennedy assassination), viewers operating voluntarily and independently, are encouraged to access the problem and record their impressions.

Sessions will be conducted independently without the presence of a monitor/interviewer.

- 4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION: Describe the nature and scope of the attack(s) against US-flagged vessels operating in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf during the month of September 1987. Specific EEI are as follows:
 - a. The nature of the attack.
 - b. The scope of the attack.
 - c. Point of origin of the attack.
 - d. The results of the attack.
- e. The nature and scope of the US military response to the attack.
 - f. The extent of Iranian casualties.
 - g. The extent of US casualties.
- 5. Request you provide summaries and include drawings of your perceptions (overhead views, equipment, uniforms, personalities etc.)

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6. See MFR attached as enclosure.

HAVE FUN - ENJOY THE FLIGHT

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45